Pollution for Promotion

dc.contributor.authorRuixue Jia
dc.date.accessioned2026-10-02T03:53:35Z
dc.date.issued2017-03-21
dc.description.abstractThis paper provides evidence on the impact of political incentives on the environment using the case of China’s pollution. Exploring variation in governors’ connections with key officials in the center, I document that gaining connections increases pollution (measured by satellite and official data). I also find that connected governors increase coal-fired power production more when less precipitation makes it more difficult to rely on hydropower. These findings are consistent with the interpretation that connections affect the promotion incentives by increasing the marginal returns of pollution.
dc.identifier.urihttps://libtraining.hcmussh.edu.vn/handle/123456789/174
dc.language.isoen_US
dc.titlePollution for Promotion
dc.typeArticle

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